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QUESTION PRESENTED  
 Whether the criminal prohibitions in 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2339B(a)(1) on provision of “training,” “expert advice 
or assistance” “derived from … other specialized 
knowledge,” and “service” to organizations designated 
as terrorist are unconstitutionally vague as applied to 
speech that furthers only lawful, nonviolent activities 
of the proscribed organizations.  
  
ii 
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS 
 
The following parties were plaintiffs in the 
district court and appellees and cross-appellants in the 
court of appeals, and are respondents in this Court:  
Humanitarian Law Project; Ralph Fertig; Ilankai 
Thamil Sangam; Tamils of Northern California; Tamil 
Welfare and Human Rights Committee; Federation of 
Tamil Sangams of North America; World Tamil 
Coordinating Committee; and Nagalingam Jeyalingam. 
 
The following parties were defendants in the 
district court and appellants and cross-appellees in the 
court of appeals, and are petitioners in this Court: the 
Attorney General of the United States, Eric Holder, Jr.; 
the United States Department of Justice; the United 
States Secretary of State, Hillary Rodham Clinton; and 
the United States Department of State. 
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BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO  
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
 
  OPINIONS BELOW 
 
The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. 1a-
32a) is reported at 552 F.3d 916.  Earlier opinions of 
the court of appeals are reported at 393 F.3d 902, 352 
F.3d 382, and 205 F.3d 1130.  The opinion of the 
district court (Pet. App. 33a-76a) is reported at 380 F. 
Supp. 2d 1134.  Earlier opinions of the district court 
are reported at 309 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 9 F. Supp. 2d 
1176, and 9 F. Supp. 2d 1205.  
 
 JURISDICTION 
 
This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§1254(1).    
 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY 
PROVISIONS INVOLVED 
 
The First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution provides, in pertinent part:  “Congress 
shall make no law … abridging the freedom of speech, 
or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to 
assemble.”  The Fifth Amendment provides, in 
pertinent part:  “No person shall … be deprived of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law.”  The 
relevant statutory provisions are reprinted at Pet. App. 
77a-81a. 
 
 STATEMENT 
 
The injunction at issue in this case narrowly 
bars the application of three provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 
  
2 
2339B, a criminal proscription carrying a penalty of 15 
years’ imprisonment or life imprisonment if death 
results, to respondents’ proposed speech in support of 
the lawful, nonviolent activities of two foreign 
organizations designated as “terrorist.”  The court of 
appeals left the entire statute valid on its face, and 
merely held that the prohibitions on providing 
“training,” “expert advice or assistance” “derived from 
… other specialized knowledge,” and “service” were 
unconstitutionally vague as applied to respondents’ 
proposed speech. Respondents seek, among other 
things, to teach persons in conflict situations how to 
use international law and other nonviolent means to 
advance human rights.  As applied to such pure speech, 
the court held, the three particular provisions are 
insufficiently clear about what they criminalize.   
 
The district court rejected all of respondents’ 
challenges except to the application of the three 
provisions noted, and therefore left intact the entire 
material-support statute on its face.  The court declined 
to issue a nationwide injunction.  Pet. App. 76a.  Even 
as applied to respondents, the court’s decision expressly 
permits enforcement of the remainder of the statute, 
which prohibits provision of, inter alia, “any property, 
tangible or intangible, … including currency or 
monetary instruments or financial securities, financial 
services, lodging, … safehouses, false documentation or 
identification, communications equipment, facilities, 
weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel … 
and transportation.”  18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b) (definitional 
provision incorporated into § 2339B); see Pet. App. 76a 
n.29.     
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The court of appeals unanimously affirmed the 
district court in all respects, upholding the limited 
injunction and rejecting the remainder of respondents’ 
claims.  The court of appeals denied the government’s 
petition for rehearing en banc, again without dissent. 
 
A. The Statutory Scheme 
 
 Sections 302 and 303 of the Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), codified at 8 
U.S.C. § 1189 and 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, respectively, 
authorize the Secretary of State to designate “foreign 
terrorist organizations” and make it a crime to provide 
certain “material support” for even nonviolent and 
humanitarian activities of such groups.  
  
 Section 1189 of 8 U.S.C. authorizes the Secretary to 
designate as “terrorist” any group: (1) that is foreign; 
(2) that has ever used or threatened to use a weapon 
against person or property; and (3) whose activities 
threaten the “national defense, foreign relations, or 
economic interests of the United States.”1  Once the 
Secretary designates a group, it becomes a crime to 
“knowingly provide[] material support or resources” to 
it, 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a), with the phrase “material 
support or resources” defined as “mean[ing]” certain 
activities listed in a definition of the same phrase in a 
related statute.  See 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(g)(4), 
incorporating definitions of 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b).  
Unlike other federal statutes criminalizing support for 
“terrorist activity,” see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(a), the 
                                                 
1
 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a) (criteria for designation); 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1182(a)(3)(B) (definition of “engage in terrorist activity”); 8 
U.S.C. §1189(d)(2) (definition of “national security”).   
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prohibition at issue here, § 2339B(a)(1), does not 
require any showing that the defendant intended that 
his support be used for any terrorist, violent, or 
independently illicit purpose.  “Knowing[]” provision of 
“material support or resources” to a designated group is 
enough. 
 
 In enacting the material-support statute in 1996, 
Congress declared that any “contribution to” a foreign 
organization that engages in terrorist activity 
“facilitates that conduct.”  AEDPA, Pub. L. No. 104-
132, § 301(a)(7), 110 Stat. 1214, 1247 (April 24, 1996), 
18 U.S.C. § 2339B note (emphasis added).  Then, in 
defining its proscriptions, Congress listed a number of 
activities, using terms of varying clarity and breadth, 
while expressly permitting unlimited donations of 
medicine and religious materials. 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2339A(b)(1).  In the Ninth Circuit, the government 
argued that Congress was trying not to impinge on 
actual speech:  
 
The law was carefully drafted … to ensure that it 
does not infringe upon constitutional rights. 
Recognizing that “[t]he First Amendment protects 
one’s right to associate with groups that are 
involved in both legal and illegal activities,” 
Congress noted that the statutory ban “only 
affects one’s contribution of financial or material 
resources” to a foreign terrorist organization, a 
ban that is permissible because “[t]he First 
Amendment’s protection of the right of association 
does not carry with it the ‘right’ to finance 
terrorist, criminal activities.”  But “[t]he basic 
protection of free association afforded individuals 
under the First Amendment remains in place” 
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in place” even under the statutory prohibition, 
because it does not prohibit “one’s right to think, 
speak, or opine in concert with, or on behalf of, 
such an organization.” 
 
C.A. First Cross-Appeal Br. for Appellants at 5-6 (Apr. 
4, 2006) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 104-383, at 43, 44 
(1995)).  And in 2004 Congress added to the statute an 
express recognition that application of the statute 
might infringe First Amendment interests, and 
disclaimed any intent to abridge such rights in the 
statute’s construction or application: 
 
(i) Rule of construction.—Nothing in this 
section shall be construed or applied so as 
to abridge the exercise of rights guaranteed 
under the First Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States. 
 
18 U.S.C. § 2339B(i) (emphasis added).   
 
 Partly in response to several decisions in this 
litigation, Congress amended the statute in the USA 
Patriot Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 805(a)(2), 115 
Stat. 272, 377 (2001), and again in the Intelligence 
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA), 
Pub. L. No. 108-458, § 6603(b), 118 Stat. 3638, 3762 
(2004).  The current version of the statute prohibits 
provision of “training,” which the statute since 2004 
has defined as “instruction or teaching designed to 
impart a specific skill, as opposed to general 
knowledge.”  18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(2).  The statute also 
outlaws the provision of “expert advice or assistance,” 
which since 2004 has been defined as “advice or 
assistance derived from scientific, technical or other 
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specialized knowledge.”  18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(3).  And, 
in a provision added in 2004, the statute prohibits the 
provision of “service,” without defining that term.  The 
government maintains that “service” includes any “act 
done for the benefit of” a designated group.  Pet. 17.  
The statute contains many other enumerated 
prohibitions that are not now at issue – quoted supra.2 
 
B.  Respondents’ Intended Support  
 
 Respondents include the Humanitarian Law 
Project (HLP), a longstanding human rights 
organization with consultative status to the United 
Nations; Ralph Fertig, a retired United States 
administrative law judge who has served as the HLP’s 
President; Nagalingam Jeyalingam, an American 
physician; and several domestic organizations of 
persons of Tamil descent. Prior to AEDPA’s enactment, 
the HLP and Judge Fertig had been assisting the 
                                                 
2
 One provision – which the court of appeals and district court 
upheld and so is not at issue in the petition (but is addressed in 
respondents’ limited conditional cross-petition) – is the prohibition 
on providing “personnel.” 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b).  Since 2004, the 
amended statute has provided:   
No person may be prosecuted under this section in 
connection with the term “personnel” unless that person has 
knowingly provided, attempted to provide, or conspired to 
provide a foreign terrorist organization with 1 or more 
individuals (who may be or include himself) to work under 
that terrorist organization’s direction or control or to 
organize, manage, supervise, or otherwise direct the 
operation of that organization. Individuals who act entirely 
independently of the foreign terrorist organization to 
advance its goals or objectives shall not be considered to be 
working under the foreign terrorist organization’s direction 
and control. 
18 U.S.C. § 2339B(h). 
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Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) in human rights 
advocacy and peacemaking efforts.  They seek to 
continue supporting the PKK in such activities.  Dr. 
Jeyalingam and the Tamil organizations similarly seek 
to engage in speech in support of the humanitarian and 
political activities of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil 
Eelam (LTTE).3   
 
 In the mid-1990s, the Secretary of State designated 
both the PKK and LTTE as terrorist organizations.  In 
this case, resolved on summary judgment, the district 
court made no findings about terrorist activities of 
either group, but did find that both groups engage in a 
broad range of lawful activities, including the provision 
of social services, political advocacy, and economic 
development.  Pet. App. 34a-36a.  The PKK is the 
principal political organization representing the Kurds 
in Turkey, an ethnic minority subjected to substantial 
discrimination and human rights violations.  See id. at 
34a-35a.  Similarly, the LTTE is the principal political 
organization representing the Tamils in Sri Lanka, 
another ethnic minority that has been subjected to 
human rights abuses and discrimination.  See id. at 
35a.  It is undisputed that respondents intend to 
support only the lawful and nonviolent activities of 
these groups. Id. at 34a-36a (describing intended 
support).   
                                                 
3
 As the petition notes, the LTTE were recently defeated militarily 
in Sri Lanka.  Pet. 5 n.1.  Much of the support the Tamil 
organizations and Dr. Jeyalingam sought to provide is now moot, 
because it consisted of humanitarian assistance to persons living 
in LTTE-controlled areas of Sri Lanka.  However, the LTTE 
continues to exist as a political organization outside Sri Lanka 
advocating for the rights of Tamils, and respondents continue to 
seek to support its lawful, nonviolent activities through the speech 
identified by the court of appeals, Pet. App. 5a n.1.  
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C.   The Decisions Below 
 
 Respondents initially filed this action in 1998, after 
the Secretary of State designated the PKK and the 
LTTE as foreign terrorist organizations.  They 
challenged the statute on First and Fifth Amendment 
grounds, and asserted, among other things, that the 
statute’s prohibitions on providing “training” and 
“personnel” were unconstitutionally vague.  (Neither 
provision was defined in the original 1996 statute).  
The district court granted respondents a preliminary 
and permanent injunction against enforcement of these 
two provisions, finding them unconstitutionally vague. 
 See Pet. App. 6a-7a.  It rejected respondents’ other 
challenges, including their contention that the statute 
infringed on the right of association.  Id.  Two separate 
panels of the court of appeals, in 2000 and 2003, 
unanimously affirmed both the preliminary and 
permanent injunctions.  Id. at 7a, 8a. 
 
 Meanwhile, when Congress in 2001 amended the 
“material support” statute to add a prohibition on the 
provision of “expert advice or assistance,” respondents 
filed a second challenge.  The district court in March 
2004 held that this provision, too, was 
unconstitutionally vague.  See id. at 8a. 
 
 In September 2004, in the original case, the court 
of appeals granted rehearing en banc (on requests from 
both parties).  Id. at 9a.  While en banc review was 
pending, Congress in 2004 amended the statute, 
providing definitions for “training,” “personnel,” and 
“expert advice or assistance,” and adding a new, and 
undefined, prohibition on the provision of “service.”  Id. 
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at 9a-10a.  In response, the en banc court of appeals 
remanded for consideration of the effect of these 
statutory amendments.  Id. at 11a.  
 
 On remand, the district court held that Congress’s 
definition of “personnel” cured the vagueness of that 
provision, but that the prohibitions on “training” and 
on “expert advice or assistance” “derived from … other 
specialized knowledge” were still unconstitutionally 
vague as applied to respondents’ intended speech.  Id. 
at 62a-66a, 68a-69a.  It also held that the new, and 
undefined, ban on the provision of “service” was vague 
as applied to respondents’ speech.  Id. at 66a-68a.  It 
rejected respondents’ other contentions.  Id. at 46a-60a, 
69a-74a. 
 
 Both parties appealed, and the court of appeals 
once again unanimously affirmed.  It reasoned that the 
constitutional “‘requirement for clarity is enhanced’” 
where, as here, a criminal statute touches on “‘sensitive 
areas of basic First Amendment freedoms.’”  Id. at 20a 
(quoting Info. Providers’ Coal. for the Def. of the First 
Amendment v. FCC, 928 F.2d 866, 874 (9th Cir. 1991)). 
 It stressed that it was addressing only the provisions’ 
vagueness as applied to respondents’ conduct, id. at 2a, 
22a n.6, and noted that those activities all constituted 
speech.  Id. at 5a n.1 (describing respondents’ proposed 
activities as “to train members … on how to use 
humanitarian and international law to peacefully 
resolve disputes”; “to engage in political advocacy”; “to 
teach … members how to petition various 
representative bodies such as the United Nations for 
relief”; “to train members to present claims for 
tsunami-related aid to mediators and international 
bodies”; “to offer their legal expertise in negotiating 
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in negotiating peace agreements”; “to engage in 
political advocacy”).4    
 
 With respect to “training,” the court found it 
“highly unlikely that a person of ordinary intelligence 
would know whether, when teaching someone to 
petition international bodies for tsunami related aid, 
one is imparting a ‘specific skill’ or ‘general 
knowledge.’”  Id. at 21a-22a.  Stressing that the term 
as defined “could still be read to encompass speech and 
advocacy protected by the First Amendment,” id. at 
22a, the court held that  
 
the term “training” remains impermissibly vague 
because it “implicates, and potentially chills, 
Plaintiffs’ protected expressive activities and 
imposes criminal sanctions of up to fifteen years 
imprisonment without sufficiently defining the 
prohibited conduct for ordinary people to 
understand.” 
 
Id. at 22a-23a (quoting id. at 64a).   
 
 The court noted that the prohibition on “expert 
advice or assistance” similarly encompassed protected 
speech, and concluded that it was unconstitutionally 
vague in part.  Id. at 24a.  Specifically, it held that the 
prohibition on advice or assistance “derived from … 
other specialized knowledge” did not give “a person of 
ordinary intelligence reasonable notice of conduct 
                                                 
4
 Respondents initially sought to provide a broader range of 
humanitarian assistance to the PKK and the LTTE, but the 
injunction affirmed by the court of appeals is limited to the speech 
activities described by the district court and the court of appeals.  
Pet. App. 5a n.1; id. at 35a-36a. 
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prohibited under the statute.”  Id. at 23a; see also id. at 
23a-24a.  But the court upheld the prohibition on 
advice or assistance “derived from scientific [or] 
technical … knowledge.”  Id. at 24a. 
 
 The court also held vague as applied the 
prohibition on “service,” which encompassed the bans 
on “training” and “expert advice or assistance” that it 
had already held vague.  Id. at 25a (adopting district 
court’s holding and reasoning at id. at 66a-68a).   
 
     The court agreed with the district court that the 
amended definition of “personnel” cured that term’s 
prior vagueness. Id. at 26a-27a. And it rejected 
respondents’ other contentions, including the 
contention that the statute imposed guilt by 
association in violation of the Fifth Amendment’s 
requirement that statutes impose only individual 
culpability.  Id. at 13a-19a; id. at 27a-32a.  
 
 REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION 
 
The petition should be denied.  The decision 
below is a straightforward application of settled 
vagueness doctrine, resulting in a narrow decision 
carefully confined to three sub-provisions of the 
material-support statute as they apply to respondents’ 
proposed speech activities.  The government has 
identified no decision from any court, much less this 
Court or a court of appeals, that is in conflict with the 
decision below.  The decision itself applies to a unique 
context involving pure speech that Congress in all 
likelihood did not intend to criminalize, and that in any 
event is peripheral to the statute’s purpose.  The 
decision leaves the material-support statute valid on 
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its face, and declares only a small portion of it vague as 
applied to respondents’ intended speech in support of 
indisputably lawful and nonviolent ends.  Thus, the 
government may continue, and has continued, to 
enforce the material-support statute, including the 
provisions enjoined as applied here.   
 
Moreover, because the decision below rests on 
vagueness, Congress remains free to define more 
precisely the conduct it seeks to prohibit, should it 
conclude that it is critical to ban “training,” “expert 
advice or assistance,” and “service” as applied to speech 
in support of otherwise lawful activities.  The court’s 
decision does not rule these activities immune from 
regulation, but merely demands greater precision. 
 
The government’s protestations about national 
security aside, it has made no showing that the limited 
injunction at issue here undermines its efforts to fight 
terrorism in any meaningful way.  Nor has it cited a 
single prosecution that was or would have been 
frustrated by the court of appeals’ narrow, as-applied 
ruling.  
 
I. The Court of Appeals’ Decision Does Not 
Warrant Review Because Its Narrow, As-
Applied Ruling Leaves the Material-Support 
Statute Facially Intact and Permits 
Congress to Take Further Action 
 
The government identifies no conflict in the 
circuits, but contends that review is nonetheless 
warranted on the ground that the decision below 
invalidates part of an Act of Congress, and because 
“the material-support statute is an important tool in 
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the Nation’s fight against international terrorism.”  
Pet. 10-11.  But the decision below leaves the entirety 
of the material-support statute facially intact, and 
enjoins only three specific sub-provisions as applied to 
respondents’ pure speech in support of lawful, 
nonviolent ends.  In any event, this Court does not 
automatically review decisions invalidating federal 
statutes.     
 
The government does not and could not assert 
that a case in which an Act of Congress is invalidated 
always merits review.  Pet. 9.  Congress itself rejected 
that conclusion in 1988, when, with the support of all 
nine Justices, it eliminated 28 U.S.C. § 1252’s 
provision for non-discretionary appellate jurisdiction in 
cases declaring federal statutes unconstitutional.  See 
United States v. Sperry Corp., 493 U.S. 52, 59 & n.5 
(1989); H.R. Rep. No. 100-660, at 2, 9 (1988), reprinted 
in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 766, 767, 774.   
 
Earlier this year, the Court denied a government 
petition seeking review of a ruling that invalidated an 
Act of Congress on First Amendment (including 
vagueness) grounds.  Mukasey v. American Civil 
Liberties Union, 129 S. Ct. 1032 (2009) (denying United 
States petition, No. 08-565, seeking review of American 
Civil Liberties Union v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 181 (3d Cir. 
2008)).  Even before the amendment of 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1252, the Court denied review where, as here, a lower 
court had merely held that a federal statute could not 
be applied constitutionally to a particular set of facts.  
Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh-Day 
Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164 (4th Cir. 1985) (declaring 
that Title VII provisions prohibiting race and sex 
discrimination were unconstitutional as applied to 
  
14 
church’s decision to hire a pastor), cert. denied, 478 
U.S. 1020 (1986). 
 
Review in this case should similarly be denied.  
The decision below is carefully circumscribed, holding 
only that three particular sub-provisions of a statute 
are invalid as applied to the pure speech in which 
respondents want to engage.  The court of appeals did 
not invalidate any aspect of the statute on its face and, 
in fact, specifically disclaimed any such ruling.  Pet. 
App. 2a-3a, 22a n.6, 27a-29a.  The court also expressly 
noted that its ruling did not extend to a situation 
where any money passed to the designated 
organizations.  Id. at 3a, 25a n.8.  The limited activities 
that the court of appeals identified as protected by the 
narrow injunction it upheld are all pure speech.  Id. at 
5a n.1 (“to train members … on how to use 
humanitarian and international law to peacefully 
resolve disputes”; “to engage in political advocacy”; “to 
teach … members how to petition various 
representative bodies such as the United Nations for 
relief”; “to train members to present claims for 
tsunami-related aid to mediators and international 
bodies”; “to offer their legal expertise in negotiating 
peace agreements”; “to engage in political advocacy”).   
   
The court of appeals’ ruling leaves the entire 
statute valid on its face.  The government is free to 
enforce the statute – including the “training,” “expert 
advice or assistance,” and “service” clauses -- in other 
contexts, and, by its own account, it has done so 
successfully.  Pet. 11.  The only direct restriction the 
decision imposes is on enforcement of three specific 
provisions against these respondents for the speech 
identified above.  The government cites not a single 
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instance of similar speech in furtherance of lawful, 
nonviolent activities that it has been frustrated from 
prosecuting.5  
 
The decision does not warrant review for a 
related reason.  The court of appeals held only that the 
particular provisions at issue were written too vaguely. 
That ruling does not foreclose further congressional 
action; Congress need only be more precise in targeting 
forms of support that it concludes warrant criminal 
prohibition, thereby avoiding needless collateral harm 
to First Amendment protected speech and association.  
Such a process of further congressional consideration 
and refinement is particularly appropriate given that 
Congress, as it expressly declared in 2004 and the 
government stressed to the court of appeals, was 
acutely aware of the sensitive First Amendment 
terrain and positively trying to avoid harm to protected 
speech. See page 4, supra.   
 
                                                 
5
 The government cites only two cases in which it has charged 
defendants with providing “training,” “expert advice or 
assistance,” or “service.”  Pet. 11.  In both it confronted no 
obstacles to proceeding.  Neither involved speech in furtherance 
solely of lawful, nonviolent ends.  In United States v. Shah, No. 05-
Cr-673 (LAP) (S.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 6, 2006), defendants were 
alleged to have provided “martial arts training and instruction” to 
al Qaeda and “medical support to wounded jihadists.”  Pet. 11.  In 
United States v. Iqbal, No. 06-Cr-1054 (RMB) (S.D.N.Y. filed Jan. 
20, 2007), defendant was alleged to have sold satellite 
transmission services to Hizballah, which the indictment 
characterized as, inter alia, “property, tangible and intangible,” 
and “facilities,“ provisions not at issue here.  Superseding 
Indictment at 3.  Both cases resulted in convictions.  The 
government has cited no case in which it has sought to prosecute 
individuals for pure speech in furtherance of lawful activities but 
was, or would have been, barred from doing so by this decision. 
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In this respect, the constitutional ruling by the 
court of appeals is not the end of the matter for 
Congress.  It bears important similarities to statutory 
rulings, to which Congress may respond through 
ordinary legislation.  Such rulings generally do not 
warrant this Court’s review without a persistent circuit 
conflict.  Indeed, when earlier versions of this very 
statute were held invalid, the Executive returned to 
Congress and obtained statutory clarifications.  While 
the court below held that some of those clarifications 
were not adequate, Congress can readily undertake 
further revisions, with the added guidance the court 
below has provided.  
 
Moreover, the government’s own argument that 
there are “numerous legitimate applications” of the ban 
on training – for example, “training a terrorist 
organization on how to build a bomb, use a weapon, fly 
a plane, or launder money” (Pet. 21) – shows how easy 
it is to write more precisely to target specific activities 
of concern, without criminalizing constitutionally 
protected speech.  Nothing in the court of appeals’ 
opinion precludes Congress from criminalizing the 
provision of instruction in techniques that terrorist 
organizations have used to carry out violent attacks. 
 
Finally, the government cites no conflict in the 
circuits, notwithstanding that the statute has been on 
the books for more than a decade, and in its current 
amended form for five years.  In the absence of any 
disagreement in the circuits, any evidence that the 
decision has undermined the government’s anti-
terrorism efforts, or any reason to believe the court’s 
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narrow as-applied holding will have wider effects, the 
case does not merit review.6    
 
II. The Decision Below Correctly Applies      
Settled Doctrine 
 
The court of appeals correctly applied clearly 
established principles of constitutional law.  Its 
conclusions that the statute’s prohibitions on the 
provision of “training,” “expert advice or assistance” in 
the form of information “derived from … specialized 
knowledge,” and “service” are unconstitutionally vague 
as applied to respondents’ proposed speech are firmly 
grounded and raise neither new nor significant 
questions of law. 
 
A.  The Provisions Are Vague As Applied to 
Respondents’ Intended Speech 
 
  1.  Training 
 
 The court of appeals correctly held that the 
prohibition on “training” requires individuals to draw 
impossible distinctions between prohibited instruction 
in a “specific skill” and permissible instruction in 
“general knowledge.”  Pet. App. 20a-23a.   Respondents 
are forced to guess at whether human rights advocacy 
                                                 
6
 The court of appeals rejected respondents’ contention that the 
bans on providing “personnel” and “expert advice or assistance” 
”derived from scientific [or] technical … knowledge” were similarly 
unconstitutional.  Respondents do not independently seek 
certiorari on those aspects of the court’s ruling.  But they are filing 
a conditional cross-petition for certiorari, because these provisions 
are sufficiently related to the three provisions at issue in the 
government’s petition to warrant review as well, if the Court 
grants review at all.  
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or peacemaking, for example, are “specific skills” or 
“general knowledge.”  And what about training in 
public speaking, lobbying Congress, or public relations? 
 The statute provides no guidance. 
 
 The attempts by government counsel below to 
clarify the distinction only confirmed how murky it is.  
Counsel opined that, under this definition, teaching 
geography would be permissible because it constitutes 
“general knowledge,” but teaching the political 
geography of terrorist organizations would constitute a 
banned “specific skill,” as would the teaching of 
English.7  What if a “general” course on geography 
included a discussion of the political geography of 
terrorist organizations?  What if it included a session 
on the history of geography, or the geography of a 
specific region incorporating statistical information?  
An ordinary person could only hazard a guess as to 
whether these are impermissible “specific skills,” or 
permissible aspects of “general knowledge.”   
 
 In the district court, government counsel 
asserted that respondents were free to advocate “on 
behalf of” the PKK before the United Nations or “any 
forum of their choosing.”  Govt. Mem. in Supp. of S.J. 
at 17 n.8.  But when the district court asked whether 
respondents could lobby the UN with members of the 
PKK present, and then divide up into groups to lobby 
the rest of the UN, counsel first opined that such 
conduct “presumably could” constitute “training,” D. 
                                                 
7 The colloquy took place during the en banc oral argument, at 
approximately 49 minutes into the argument.  At the time of oral 
argument, Congress had passed IRTPA, but President Bush had 
not yet signed it into law.   
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Ct. Tr. 11, SER 220,8 and minutes later opined that it 
“clearly comes within the proscriptions against training 
and expert advice or assistance.”  Id. at 15; SER 224.  
At the close of the colloquy, the district court said, “I 
don’t know how you think anyone, a normal person, 
would figure this out based on this exchange.”  Id. at 
19, SER 228.  The court of appeals correctly 
determined that this provision is unconstitutionally 
vague as applied to respondents’ proposed speech. 
 
  2.  Expert Advice or Assistance 
 
 The court also correctly concluded that the ban 
on providing “expert advice or assistance” “derived 
from … specialized knowledge” is unconstitutionally 
vague.  Much as with “training,” a citizen must guess 
as to whether any aspect of his advice is somehow 
derived from “other specialized knowledge.”  An expert 
on human rights could presumably provide advice only 
if it was derived from “general knowledge,” but not if 
any particular answer was informed by “specialized 
knowledge.”  But how does one distinguish which 
aspects of human rights derive from general as opposed 
to specialized knowledge?  Indeed, if general knowledge 
is “specialized knowledge” that has become sufficiently 
widely known, then literally all general knowledge may 
be said to be “derived from” specialized knowledge.9  
                                                 
8
 “SER” refers to the Supplemental Excerpts of Record in the court 
of appeals.  
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knowledge.9  The lower court correctly determined that 
this provision, too, is vague as applied here. 
   
  3.  Service  
 
 The most expansive provision in the definition of 
“material support” is the prohibition on providing any 
“service” to a designated group, which Congress added 
in 2004 without defining the term.  That term was 
likewise correctly held unconstitutionally vague. 
 
 Attempting to show otherwise, the government, 
citing a dictionary, maintains that the term 
encompasses any “act done for the benefit ... of 
another.” Pet. 17.  But that interpretation only makes 
matters more confusing, as it appears to conflict with 
the narrowing limitations Congress simultaneously 
placed in the statute’s other definitions.  Thus, while 
Congress provided that teaching a subject of “general 
knowledge” would not constitute prohibited “training,” 
it could be considered an “act done for the benefit of” a 
designated group.  Similarly, advice derived from non-
specialized knowledge is exempted from the “expert 
advice” definition, but could be prohibited by the 
                                                 
9
 The government notes that the definition tracks Federal Rule of 
Evidence 702.  Pet. 15.  As the district court held, however, Rule 
702, a general guide for trained judges and lawyers, “does not 
clarify the term ... for the average person with no background in 
the law.”  Pet. App. 66a.  It is one thing to use the standard as a 
guide to judges overseeing civil litigation; it is another to hold 
citizens criminally liable under such terms.  Here, as elsewhere in 
the law, “context matters.”  Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita 
Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 431 (2006) (quoting 
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327 (2003)); see Parents 
Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 
2754 (2007); Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 723 (2005). 
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government’s gloss on “service.”  The “personnel” 
definition added in 2004 likewise seeks to protect acts 
done “entirely independently of the … organization to 
advance its goals or objectives,” 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(h), 
yet such activity would be a crime if seen as “for the 
benefit of” the organization.  And, as noted above, 
Congress in 2004 (the same time that it added the 
“service” prohibition) specifically disclaimed that its 
statute should be construed or applied to outlaw 
protected speech (id. § 2339B(i)) – such as, e.g., a 
domestic speech stressing the humanitarian work of a 
designated organization to improve its reputation, 
which could certainly be seen as “for the benefit of” the 
organization.  The government’s construction of 
“service” renders the statute hopelessly vague. 
 
 At the same time, the government claims that 
the statute does not reach advocacy “on behalf of” a 
designated group.  Govt. Mem. in Supp. of S.J. at 17 
n.8.  But if that is so, respondents must somehow 
distinguish between permissibly advocating “on behalf 
of” and impermissibly advocating “for the benefit of” a 
designated group.  How is an ordinary person supposed 
to know whether his advocacy of the PKK’s position on 
Kurdish human rights is permissible advocacy “on 
behalf of” the group, or a proscribed service “for the 
benefit of” the group?  
 
 As construed by the government, the “service” 
provision also forces individuals to guess whether their 
affiliation with a group may constitute a prohibited 
“service.”  Before the “service” prohibition was added in 
2004, the government represented that citizens were 
free under this statute to join designated groups, and 
that concession was critical to the court of appeals’ 
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rejection of respondents’ right-of-association challenge. 
 Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 
1133-34 (9th Cir. 2000) (rejecting First Amendment 
associational challenge because the statute permits 
membership and affiliation with foreign terrorist 
organizations, but prohibits the conduct of providing 
material support or resources).  But the permissibility 
of membership and affiliation is now in doubt.  Joining 
or affiliating with a political organization is 
quintessentially an act done “for the benefit of” the 
group.  Thus, the government’s construction would 
appear to criminalize even pure membership and 
affiliation.  The government does not explain how one 
is supposed to distinguish between ostensibly 
permitted membership and advocacy, on the one hand, 
and “service,” on the other.  Citizens are forced to 
guess, at their peril.  Accordingly, the court of appeals 
correctly deemed this provision unconstitutional as 
applied as well. 
 
B. The Provisions At Issue Directly   
Implicate Speech and Associational Rights, 
Triggering Heightened Vagueness 
Standards 
 
The government’s principal response to the court 
of appeals’ unsurprising and unanimous conclusion 
that these provisions are vague as applied to 
respondents’ speech is to cite inapposite examples of 
terms deemed not vague where First Amendment 
interests and/or criminal penalties were not at stake.  
Pet. 13-18.  But vagueness standards are at their most 
demanding when a criminal prohibition affects speech. 
 Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 
871-72 (1997); Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 
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Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 499 (1982).  All of 
the government’s examples arise from contexts 
tolerating more lenient vagueness standards – such as 
determining an appropriate attorney’s fee (Pet. 15),10 
admitting expert evidence in court (Pet. 16),11 
prohibiting the overseas transfer of money (Pet. 17)12 
or heavy equipment (Pet. 18),13 or noncriminal 
regulation of public employees’ speech (Pet. 14).14 
                                                 
10 Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 572 (1988).  Pierce did not 
address any vagueness issue, or purport to define (or explore the 
precision of) the difference between “some distinctive knowledge or 
specialized [litigation] skill” and “general lawyerly knowledge” – 
both of which, from a lay person’s perspective, might or might not 
be “specialized knowledge” in the present context. 
11 Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 149 (1999).  
Kumho did not address any vagueness issue, or purport to explore 
the precision of “specialized knowledge” in Fed. R. Evid. 702. 
12 United States v. Homa Int’l Trading Corp., 387 F.3d 144, 146 (2d 
Cir. 2004) (transferring money for a fee was undeniably a service). 
13 United States v. Hescorp, Heavy Equip. Sales Corp., 801 F.2d 70, 
73-77 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1018 (1986).  Hescorp 
undertook a lengthy analysis of an Executive Order’s various 
provisions and its history before concluding that, in context, the 
“service” exception in the order could not reasonably be 
understood to apply to limit the separately stated flat prohibition 
on transferring physical goods to Iran.  Even in the absence of a 
speech issue, the court’s rejection of an ordinary vagueness 
challenge required extensive reliance on interpretive guides that 
are simply missing in the present context. 
14 The government’s one cited authority involving speech is the 
Ninth Circuit’s own decision in California Teachers Ass’n v. State 
Bd. of Educ., 271 F.3d 1141 (9th Cir. 2001).  There, the court 
rejected a facial vagueness challenge to a law that required public 
school teachers to use English predominantly in their instruction.  
In that context, involving the interests of public employees in 
public schools and no apparent criminal penalties, the court 
explained that the rest of the law made clear that “instruction” 
was tied to the “curriculum,” and on that basis concluded that 
there was no substantial number of instances where there would 
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 The government maintains that, as applied in 
this case, “the material-support statute does not 
regulate speech,” and therefore does not warrant 
heightened vagueness scrutiny.  Pet. 13.  That is 
simply false, both as applied and more generally.  All of 
the activities the court of appeals listed as at stake 
here are pure speech.  See Pet. App. 5a n.1 (quoted at 
page 10, supra).  More generally, when the statute 
prohibits “training,” defined as “instruction or 
teaching,” it  directly criminalizes speech.  When the 
statute prohibits conveying “expert advice,” it again 
directly criminalizes speech.  And when the statute 
prohibits “service” as applied to respondents’ intended 
activities, it also criminalizes speech – including, 
according to the government, any advocacy done “for 
the benefit of” a designated group.  As applied here, 
these provisions would criminalize the teaching of 
humanitarian and international law, as well as 
political advocacy.  The essential premise of the 
Government’s challenge in its petition is therefore 
wrong. 
 
 For the same reason, the government is 
mistaken in contending that the material-support 
statute is sustainable as a  content-neutral regulation 
of conduct under United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 
367, 377 (1968).  Pet. 19-20.  The O’Brien intermediate 
scrutiny standard is reserved for content-neutral 
regulations of conduct that only incidentally affect 
speech or association, i.e., where the conduct might 
have an expressive aspect.  O’Brien does not apply to 
                                                                                                    
be doubt about when English had to be used – in the classroom to 
present the curriculum, not in private conversations with students 
and parents, etc.  
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direct criminalization of actual speech or association, or 
to content-based discrimination.  See, e.g., Texas v. 
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 402-03 (1989) (O’Brien 
inapplicable to content-based flag desecration law).  As 
shown above, the statute here criminalizes speech qua 
speech.  And, far from being a mere regulation of time, 
place, or manner, it flatly bans certain speech to or for 
certain persons.  Moreover, the provisions barring 
“training” and “expert advice or assistance” expressly 
discriminate on the basis of its content, favoring speech 
on subjects of “general knowledge” and disfavoring 
speech about “specific skill[s]” or derived from 
“specialized knowledge.”  Thus, O’Brien does not apply. 
 
 O’Brien also does not apply where a law directly 
regulates expressive association.  In Boy Scouts v. Dale, 
530 U.S. 640, 659 (2000), the Court held O’Brien 
inapplicable where a state’s general ban on 
discrimination in public accommodations was applied 
to the Boy Scouts in a way that directly infringed the 
group’s rights of “expressive association” (by restricting 
its ability to choose who would serve as a scoutmaster). 
As the Court explained: 
   
Dale contends that we should apply the 
intermediate standard of review enunciated in 
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), to 
evaluate the competing interests.  There the 
Court enunciated a four-part test for review of a 
governmental regulation that has only an 
incidental effect on protected speech-in that case 
the symbolic burning of a draft card.  A law 
prohibiting the destruction of draft cards only 
incidentally affects the free speech rights of those 
who happen to use a violation of that law as a 
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symbol of protest.  But New Jersey's public 
accommodations law directly and immediately 
affects associational rights, in this case 
associational rights that enjoy First Amendment 
protection.  Thus, O'Brien is inapplicable. 
 
The same holds true in this case.  As in Dale, the 
application of the law directly infringes respondents’ 
associational rights, by precluding them from engaging 
in any expressive activity whatsoever in conjunction 
with the PKK or the LTTE.  
 
Indeed, the challenged provisions’ 
criminalization of speech and imposition of liability on 
the basis of association with proscribed groups provide 
independent grounds for affirming the court of appeals’ 
decision.15  The “training” and “expert advice” 
provisions criminalize speech on the basis of its 
content; and the “service” provision reaches speech and 
association that Congress, trying to avoid First 
Amendment harm, showed no interest in proscribing.  
Because these provisions do not meet the tailoring and 
interest requirements of any applicable First 
Amendment test, they independently violate the First 
Amendment.16   
                                                 
15 Respondents argued below that the material-support statute as 
a whole, as well as the specific provisions at issue here, were 
invalid because they imposed guilt by association, in violation of 
the First Amendment right of association and the Fifth 
Amendment principle of individual culpability, and that the 
provisions at issue were vague on their face  The court of appeals 
rejected those contentions, but respondents have preserved the 
arguments, and they are independent bases for affirming the 
injunction at issue here.  
16
 The provisions also are substantially overbroad.  Rather than 
restricting their scope to support that furthers terrorist activity, 
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In addition, all three challenged provisions 
penalize association, because their penalties are 
triggered by the identity of the organization with which 
respondents collaborate.  Training the Irish Republican 
Army in human rights advocacy, for example, is 
permitted; but the very same training provided to the 
PKK is a crime.  Lobbying in conjunction with the 
Palestine Liberation Organization is permissible; but 
doing so in conjunction with the PKK is not.  A law 
barring the provision of services to the Kiwanis Club, 
but prohibiting the same services if provided to the 
Rotary Club, would readily be seen as a penalty on 
association.  That the targeted groups here are labeled 
“terrorist” does not alter the fact that the trigger for 
the criminal penalty is not the nature of the underlying 
training, advice, or service, but the nature of the 
association.  As such, like the public accommodations 
law in Dale, the provisions at issue here directly 
penalize association, and can withstand constitutional 
challenge only if they are narrowly tailored to serve a 
compelling interest – which they are not.17 
                                                                                                    
they sweep within their ambit a substantial amount of political 
speech, advocacy, and association having no nexus whatsoever to 
terrorism.   See Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451 (1987); Broadrick v. 
Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973).   
    The government contends that the court “confused the 
vagueness and overbreadth doctrines.”  Pet. 18-19.  But this 
misreads the court of appeals’ opinion.  The court merely noted, in 
finding the terms vague, that they could conceivably encompass a 
broad range of constitutionally protected speech.  Pet. App. 22a, 
24a, 25a.  This was perfectly appropriate, because whether a 
statute potentially criminalizes speech is “the most important 
factor” affecting vagueness analysis.  Village of Hoffman Estates, 
455 U.S. at 499.  
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not.17 
 
C.  The Government’s Proposed Statutory 
Construction Conflicts with the 
Statute’s Plain Language, and Would 
Not Cure the Provisions’ Infirmities 
 
    Finally, the government is wrong that the 
challenged provisions could have been saved by 
interpreting them not to apply to “independent 
advocacy.”  Pet. 21.  While courts are obliged to 
construe ambiguous statutes to avoid constitutional 
questions, they can do so “only when such a course is 
‘fairly possible’ or when the statute provides a ‘fair 
alternative’ construction.”  Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 
372, 378-79 n.11 (1977). Here, the government’s 
proposed construction is not “fairly possible,” and in 
any event would not cure the constitutional defect. 
 
It is not “fairly possible” because Congress 
specifically addressed the scope of an exception for 
“independent advocacy,” and chose to make “entirely 
independent” advocacy a safe harbor only from the 
specific prohibition on “personnel,” and not from any of 
the statute’s other prohibitions.  18 U.S.C. § 2339B(h).  
To read the statute as containing a general 
                                                 
17 This Court has repeatedly held that association-based penalties 
must be restricted to association that is intended to further the 
unlawful ends of the group.  See, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne 
Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 920 (1982); United States v. Robel, 
389 U.S. 258, 262 (1967); Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 
589, 606 (1967); Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11, 19 (1966) (“a 
law which applies to membership without the ‘specific intent’ to 
further the illegal aims of the organization infringes unnecessarily 
on protected freedoms”); Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 299-
300 (1961). 
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“independent advocacy” exception would disregard 
Congress’s choice to limit that exception to one 
particular provision. 
 
If the government wishes to rewrite the statute, 
it should approach Congress, not this Court.  The court 
of appeals’ narrow ruling invites such congressional 
reconsideration.  It is not too much to ask Congress to 
engage in that process, given the importance of the 
constitutional rights at stake – rights that, as the 
government has argued and Congress has declared, 
Congress sought to respect. 
 
In any event, the government’s proposed 
construction would not save the statute.  For one thing, 
the government’s notion of “independent advocacy” 
would not seem to cover speaking to members of the 
organization, as respondents proposed to do here.  That 
is enough to make the government’s proposal not a 
“saving” construction.  And even when the audience is 
outside the organization, activities such as writing, 
speaking, and teaching do not lose their First 
Amendment protection when done in coordination with 
others.  Newspaper reporters, for example, do not 
forfeit their First Amendment rights because they 
write under the direction of their editors.     
 
 Finally, the government’s proposed construction 
would not clarify the provisions’ vagueness.  Citizens 
would still have to guess at whether their activities 
were entirely “independent,” or involved “some 
collaboration or other relationship between the giver 
and the recipient.”  Pet. 22.  Would checking facts with 
a PKK official on a human rights complaint constitute 
a “collaboration or other relationship” warranting 
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criminal sanctions?  Virtually any effort to 
communicate with a designated group regarding one’s 
advocacy could be viewed as forfeiting independence 
and entering a “collaboration or other relationship.”  
The government’s proposed “construction” would only 
further muddy the waters. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
For all of the above reasons, the petition for a 
writ of certiorari should be denied.  
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